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Abstract
Alexithymia is a trait comprising people’s ability to focus attention on and accurately
appraise their own emotions. Its assessment is of clinical interest because people who have
difficulty processing their negative and positive emotions are more vulnerable to developing
psychopathology symptoms, however, existing alexithymia measures cannot
comprehensively assess the construct across both negative and positive emotions. In this
paper, we attempt to remedy these measurement limitations by developing and validating a
new 24-item self-report measure, the Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire (PAQ), which is based
on the attention-appraisal model of alexithymia. In Study 1, our confirmatory factor analyses
in a sample of 231 adults suggested that the PAQ had a factor structure consistent with its
theoretical basis; it could separately measure all components of the construct and do so across
negative and positive emotions. All subscale and composite scores had high internal
consistency reliability. Study 2 (N=748) replicated these findings with respect to the PAQ’s
factor structure and internal consistency reliability, and statistical comparisons with measures
of psychopathology and emotion regulation supported the PAQ’s concurrent and discriminant
validity. Our data therefore suggest that the PAQ has strong psychometric properties as a
measure of alexithymia. Clinical and research applications are discussed.
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The Psychometric Assessment of Alexithymia: Development and Validation of the Perth
Alexithymia Questionnaire
Emotions manifest as responses across the subjective-experiential (e.g., feeling of
fear), physiological (e.g., increased breathing-rate), and behavioural channels (e.g., urge to
escape) of the emotion system (Gross, 2014). Emotions may be negatively valenced, like
sadness and anger, or positively valenced, like happiness (Bradley & Lang, 2007). People
differ in their capacity to process their emotional responses, and these variations reflect
individual differences in the trait alexithymia (Gross, 2014; Lane et al., 2015; Nemiah &
Sifneos, 1970; Preece et al., 2017; Taylor et al., 1999; Vorst & Bermond, 2001).
The alexithymia construct is of substantial clinical interest, because high levels of
alexithymia appear to be an important transdiagnostic risk factor for a range of
psychopathologies, including depressive (Honkalampi et al., 2001), anxiety (Zeitlin &
McNally, 1993), psychosomatic (Duddu et al., 2003), substance use (Thorberg et al., 2009),
eating (Taylor et al.,1996) and personality (Berenbaum, 1996) disorders. High levels of
alexithymia can also reduce the efficacy of some psychotherapy approaches (e.g.,
psychoanalysis; Leweke et al., 2009). Researchers have consequently developed several
measures of alexithymia, but as we will demonstrate below, these measures have some
notable limitations that reduce their clinical and research utility. We, in this paper, attempt to
remedy this by reporting on our development and validation of a new self-report measure of
alexithymia called the Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire (PAQ).
Theoretical background
Alexithymia (meaning “no words for emotions” in Greek) was first coined by
psychoanalytic practitioners (Nemiah & Sifneos, 1970; Sifneos, 1973) to describe the
presentation of psychosomatic patients who were commonly unable to “describe their
feelings or to differentiate among them” and displayed “an absence of the capacity to produce
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fantasies with the result that [their] thought content [was] restricted to a preoccupation with
external objects, people, and environmental events” (Nemiah, 1984, p. 127). Early theoretical
models of alexithymia were therefore mostly underpinned by psychoanalytic ideas, and
conceptualised alexithymia as a multidimensional construct comprised of at least four
components: difficulty identifying one’s own feelings (DIF); difficulty describing feelings
(DDF); an externally orientated thinking style (EOT) marked by an excessive focus on
external stimuli rather than internal experiences; and difficulty fantasising (DFAN) marked
by the absence or scarcity of daydreams and fantasies (e.g., Nemiah, 1977; Taylor et al.,
1985). Proponents of these psychoanalytic models hypothesised that people with high levels
of alexithymia were more vulnerable to somatic or psychiatric symptoms because they were
unable to use mental elaboration or fantasy to regulate the energy of their instinctual drives
(e.g., McDougall, 1974; Nemiah, 1977).
Several psychometric tools were subsequently designed to assess these proposed
components of alexithymia (e.g., Bermond et al., 1999; Taylor et al., 1985; Bagby et al.,
2006), and statistical analyses of these measures supported most specifications of the early
theoretical models. DIF, DDF and EOT subscales, for example, were commonly found to
correlate positively (e.g., Bagby, Taylor, & Parker, 1994; Vorst & Bermond, 2001) and load
together on the same higher-order “alexithymia” factor in factor analyses (e.g., Gignac et al.,
2007; Preece, Becerra, Robinson, & Dandy, 2018). Little statistical support emerged,
however, for the inclusion of DFAN, suggesting that its inclusion in early models was likely
a misspecification (for a review, see Preece et al., 2017). DFAN subscales were found, in
most empirical studies, to be uncorrelated or negatively correlated with DIF, DDF and EOT
subscales (e.g., Taylor et al., 1985; Preece et al., 2017; Vorst & Bermond, 2001; Watters,
Taylor, & Bagby, 2016).
Some test developers consequently removed all DFAN items from their alexithymia
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measures (e.g., Bagby et al., 1994; Sekely, Bagby, & Taylor, 2018) or changed their scoring
procedures so that DFAN items were not included when calculating an overall alexithymia
score (e.g., Vorst & Bermond, 2001). Until recently, though, this body of empirical work had
not resulted in any substantial modifications to alexithymia models and they all still included
DFAN within their definition of alexithymia (e.g., Sifneos, 1996; Taylor et al., 1999;
Bermond et al., 1999). This discrepancy between alexithymia models and the alexithymia
measurement (Bagby et al., 2007) was, however, recently addressed by Preece et al. (2017)
via their introduction of the attention-appraisal model of alexithymia. The attention-appraisal
model was an evolution of earlier alexithymia models (Sifneos, 1996; Taylor et al., 1999), but
included modifications to be consistent with the abovementioned body of empirical findings
(i.e., removing DFAN), and modifications to directly align it with established cognitive
models of emotion regulation (Gross’s [2015a] extended process model of emotion
regulation) and emotion processing (Lane and Schwartz’s [1987] cognitive-developmental
theory of levels of emotional awareness).
We think the conceptual clarity afforded by this new alexithymia model, alongside the
accumulated body of data on existing alexithymia measures, consequently provides an
excellent opportunity to now build on this work and develop the PAQ as a new alexithymia
measure with better psychometric properties than existing measures. Prior to describing the
structure of our proposed PAQ, we firstly provide a more detailed description of the
theoretical model upon which it is based, outline the psychometric criteria against which we
think the utility of any alexithymia measure must be evaluated, and briefly review how well
existing measures meet these criteria.
Attention-appraisal model of alexithymia
The attention-appraisal model (Preece et al., 2017), which underpins the proposed
PAQ, defines alexithymia as a continuous and multidimensional construct comprised of three
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interrelated components: DIF, DDF, and EOT. These components are conceptualised within a
valuation systems framework; valuation systems being systems comprised of a four-stage
situation-attention-appraisal-response sequence, through which a person valuates (evaluates)
the meaning of a stimulus (see Gross, 2015a). Normally when an emotional response
becomes the stimulus (situation stage) that is target of valuation, the person focuses his or her
attention on the emotional response (attention stage), he or she then appraises the emotional
response in terms of what it is and what it means (appraisal stage) and, based on this
appraisal, he or she might activate a goal to try to modify the emotion (response stage; i.e.,
emotion regulation; Gross, 2015a). EOT is conceptualised as difficulty at the attention stage
of this valuation system, and DIF and DDF are difficulties at the appraisal stage. In other
words, when an emotional response occurs, people with high levels of alexithymia have
trouble focusing their attention on it and trouble accurately appraising what it is. There is a
subtle shift in emphasis here when describing EOT relative to early psychoanalytic models
(e.g., Nemiah, 1984); the pertinent point is not that alexithymic people focus excessively on
external stimuli, but rather, from the reverse perspective, that they do not properly focus their
attention on their emotions. Thus, DIF, DDF and EOT are considered components of a
common latent construct because they are deficits specific to the emotion valuation process
(Preece et al., 2017).
The severity of these attention and appraisal difficulties is further understood and
categorised in this model according to the five Piagetian cognitive-developmental levels of
emotional awareness first described by Lane and Schwartz (1987). People operating at a low
developmental level (i.e., high alexithymia) experience emotions only as undifferentiated
pleasant or unpleasant states (e.g., “I am feeling bad” or “I am feeling good”), whereas
people operating at a higher developmental level (i.e., low alexithymia) experience emotions
in a more nuanced and differentiated manner (e.g., “I am feeling angry, not sad”, or “I am
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feeling excited, not amused”; Lane & Schwartz, 1987). Preece et al. (2017) posit, consistent
with the current body of empirical findings, that people’s level of alexithymia depends on the
developmental level of their emotion schemas (i.e., those cognitive structures used to process
emotions; Lane et al., 1996; Luminet et al., 2006; Lundh et al., 2002; Suslow & Junghanns,
2002; Vermeulen et al., 2006) and the extent to which they use experiential avoidance of
emotions as an emotion regulation strategy (Bilotta et al., 2015; Coriale et al., 2012;
Panayiotou et al., 2015).
Criteria for judging measures of alexithymia
A measure of alexithymia must have good levels of validity and reliability to have
research and clinical utility (Groth-Marnat, 2009). A fundamental starting point for such
validity is that an alexithymia measure’s content should capture all facets of the construct.
Because alexithymia is a multidimensional construct, this assumes that there is some
statistical or theoretical value in being able to assess each component of the construct
separately, as well as some value in being able to combine all components together into an
overall composite score (Reise et al., 2010). An alexithymia measure should therefore include
DIF, DDF and EOT items, and should allow for separate subscales to be derived for each of
these components.
A measure of alexithymia, which is an affective phenomenon, should also be able to
assess it across both negatively and positively valenced emotions (John & Eng, 2014).
Valence-specific measurement is, indeed, now common in newer measures of other affective
phenomena like emotion regulation and emotional reactivity (e.g., Becerra et al., 2017;
Ripper, Boyes, Clarke, & Hasking, 2018; Weiss et al., 2015; Zou et al., 2017), and recent
empirical work has highlighted that valence is an important consideration in alexithymia
assessments. Barrett et al. (2001) have, for example, demonstrated that people’s ability to
differentiate between their various negative emotions is not equivalent to their ability to
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differentiate between their various positive emotions, and van der Velde et al.’s (2013) recent
meta-analysis demonstrated that alexithymia has different neural correlates depending on
whether the emotions being processed are negative or positive. Localised brain injury may
therefore cause valence-specific emotion processing deficits (Becerra, Amos, & Jongenelis,
2002). Emotional valence is of most relevance when attempting to assess functioning at the
appraisal stage of emotional valuation (i.e., DIF and DDF) because, theoretically speaking, it
is not until the appraisal stage of emotion valuation that a valence judgement is made (Gross,
2015a; Ochsner & Gross, 2014; Preece et al., 2017). It is, hence, less appropriate to include
valence when attempting to isolate the earlier attention stage (i.e., EOT). 14 An alexithymia
measure should therefore allow for separate DIF and DDF subscales to be derived for
negative and positive emotions.
Outside of these content considerations, an alexithymia measure should also meet
accepted statistical standards when its validity and reliability are formally tested (Kline,
2013). Many psychometricians agree, for example, that when subjected to factor analysis the
pattern of factor loadings and factor intercorrelations in a measure should be consistent with
its theoretical basis, and all items should load well (factor loadings >.40) on their intended
latent factor (i.e., factorial validity; Groth-Marnat, 2009; Kline, 2013). Scores should,
similarly, correlate in expected ways with established measures of other constructs (i.e.,
concurrent validity), and reliability coefficients should be at least .70 for a score to be used in
research and ideally .90 or above for a score to be used in clinical decision making (GrothMarnat, 2009; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994).
For sake of clarity, in the remainder of this paper, we categorise and label these
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When EOT items in other self-report measures have been modified to include a negative valence (e.g., a
modified form of the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale where the phrase “When I’m upset, …” was
added to the start of all DIF and EOT items), these EOT items become statistically indistinguishable from DIF
items (see Bardeen et al., 2016).
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abovementioned considerations into three broad measurement criteria, against which we will
evaluate all available alexithymia measures:
(1) Allows separate DIF, DDF, and EOT subscales to be derived;
(2) Accounts for emotional valence when assessing functioning at the appraisal stage
of emotion valuation (i.e., DIF and DDF);
(3) Subscale and composite scores have adequate validity and reliability when tested
statistically.
Existing measures of alexithymia
We identified 14 psychometric tools that are either specifically designed to measure
alexithymia or are designed to measure a broader construct (e.g., emotional intelligence) but
have some alexithymia subscales (see Table 7.1). In our view, none of these measures meet
all three of the abovementioned measurement criteria. With respect to our first criterion, ten
measures cannot produce separate DIF, DDF and EOT subscales (ASC, CAM, CAQ-AP,
DERS, LEAS, M-BIQ, OAS, PTI-AS, RAS, TMMS). With respect to our second criterion,
no measures can produce valence-specific scores. With respect to our third criterion, two
measures have at least one subscale that has low validity or reliability (TAS-20, BVAQ).
Because the TAS-20 (Bagby et al., 1994) and BVAQ (Vorst & Bermond, 2001) are
presently the most widely used measures of alexithymia, we briefly examine these two
measures against our criteria in more detail below.

10

Table 7. 1.
A List of Existing Psychometric Tools Designed to Measure Alexithymia or Designed to Measure a
Broader Construct (i.e., Emotional Intelligence) but Which Have Some Alexithymia Subscales
Name and type of measure
Self-report measures
Levels of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS; Lane et al., 1990)
20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby et al., 1994)
Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS; Salovey et al., 1995)
Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire (BVAQ; Vorst & Bermond, 2001)
Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Scale (DERS; Gratz & Roemer, 2004)
Emotion Awareness Questionnaire (EAQ-30; Rieffe et al., 2008)
Psychological Treatment Inventory – Alexithymia Scale (PTI-AS; Gori et al., 2012)
Observer-rated measures
California Q-set Alexithymia Prototype (CAQ-AP; Haviland & Reise, 1996)
Alexithymia Scale for Children (ASC; Fukunishi et al., 1998)
Modified Beth Israel Hospital Psychosomatic Questionnaire (M-BIQ; Taylor et al., 1999)
Observer Alexithymia Scale (OAS; Haviland et al., 2000)
Toronto Structured Interview for Alexithymia (TSIA; Bagby et al., 2006)
Children’s Alexithymia Measure (CAM; Way et al., 2010)
Projective tests
Rorschach Alexithymia Scale (RAS; Porcelli & Mihura, 2010).
Note. Some of these measures are revisions of earlier measures. We list only the latest version of each
measure here.

20-item Toronto Alexithymia Scale. The TAS-20 (Bagby et al., 1994) is a 20-item
self-report measure of alexithymia. Items correspond to three subscales, designed to measure
DIF (7 items), DDF (5 items), or EOT (8 items). All items are also summed into a total scale
score as an overall marker of alexithymia (Bagby et al., 1994). The TAS-20 therefore meets
the first of our three measurement criteria.
Two of the DIF items specify a negative valence (e.g., “I often don’t know why I’m
angry”), but all other DIF and DDF items specify no valence (e.g., “I am often confused
about what emotion I am feeling”). Thus factor analytic studies of the TAS-20 suggest no
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valence-specific subscales can be derived (e.g., Kooiman et al., 2002). The TAS-20 therefore
does not meet our second measurement criterion.
The total scale score and DIF and DDF subscales commonly have adequate factorial
validity and reliability coefficients over .70, but the EOT subscale does not (Preece, Becerra,
Robinson, & Dandy, 2018). Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients for the EOT subscale
are often under .60, and many EOT items load poorly (factor loadings < .40) on their
intended factor (e.g., Kooiman et al., 2002; Preece, Becerra, Robinson, & Dandy, 2018;
Taylor et al., 2003). Available data therefore suggest that the TAS-20 is of limited utility for
any clinical or research purposes that require the isolation of EOT (e.g., Leweke et al., 2012;
Lyvers, McCann, Coundouris, Edwards, & Thorberg, 2018). Additionally, whilst the TAS-20
total scale score consistently meets minimum reliability standards for use in research (e.g.,
Taylor et al., 2003), we are not aware of any studies where it reaches the .90 value that is
desired for clinical decision making. The TAS-20 therefore does not meet our third
measurement criterion. Recent psychometric studies have suggested that these reliability
problems are due to its factor structure being disrupted by the poor content validity of several
EOT items (Preece, Becerra, Robinson, & Dandy, 2018) and the reverse-scored format 15 of
five items (Gignac et al., 2007; Meganck et al., 2008; Preece, Becerra, Robinson, & Dandy,
2018).
Bermond-Vorst Alexithymia Questionnaire. The BVAQ (Vorst & Bermond, 2001)
is a 40-item self-report measure of alexithymia. The BVAQ is based on Bermond et al.’s
(1999) theoretical model of alexithymia, in which they hypothesise that DIF, DDF, EOT,
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Reverse-scored items are items that mean the opposite to the other items in the scale. In the case of the TAS20, the five reverse-scored items describe a low level of alexithymia, rather than a high level of alexithymia.
Participant responses on the 5-point Likert scale for these reverse-scored items must, therefore, be reversed by
the examiner prior to calculating subscale and total scale scores. Recent research has found that including
reverse-scored items within a self-report scale is problematic because it tends to increase cognitive burden on
the examinee, it produces a method factor within the scale’s factor structure, and it decreases internal
consistency reliability (see van Sonderen et al., 2013).
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DFAN, and reduced emotional reactivity (difficulty emotionalising; DEMO) are components
of alexithymia. Items therefore correspond to five subscales; DIF (8 items), DDF (8 items),
EOT (8 items), DFAN (8 items), and DEMO (8 items). In practice, however, the DFAN and
DEMO subscales are not summed into the same total scale score as the DIF, DDF and EOT
subscales. Standard scoring, based on factor analytic results (e.g., Bermond et al., 2007),
involves the DIF, DDF and EOT subscales being summed into a composite score that
Bermond et al. (2007) label cognitive alexithymia, and the DFAN and DEMO subscales
being summed into a separate (uncorrelated) composite score labelled affective alexithymia.
Proponents of the attention-appraisal model consider only the cognitive alexithymia score to
be a marker of alexithymia (Preece et al., 2017). The BVAQ therefore meets the first of our
three measurement criteria.
Five DIF items and two DDF items specify a negative valence (e.g., “When I am hard
on myself, it remains unclear to me whether I am sad or afraid or unhappy”), and two DIF
items specify a positive valence (e.g., “When I am in a sunny mood, I know whether I am
enthusiastic or cheerful or elated [reverse-scored]”), but the remaining seven DIF or DDF
items specify no valence (e.g., “I can express my feelings verbally [reverse-scored]”). Factor
analyses of the items, hence, suggest that no valence-specific subscales can be derived (Vorst
& Bermond, 2001). The BVAQ therefore does not meet our second measurement criterion.
The DIF and DDF subscales commonly reach minimum reliability standards for use
in research (Cronbach’s alpha >.70; Bermond et al., 2007; Vorst & Bermond, 2001), but the
EOT subscale sometimes does not (e.g., Bermond et al., 2007; Muller et al., 2004). In all
studies we have seen, reliability coefficients for the cognitive alexithymia composite score
have also not reached the .90 value desired for clinical decision making (e.g., Vorst &
Bermond, 2001; Preece et al., 2017). The BVAQ therefore does not meet our third
measurement criterion. Reliability coefficients are likely lowered by the high proportion of
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reverse-scored items (20 items) in the measure (van Sonderen et al., 2013). Recent research
has, furthermore, found that the DEMO subscale score is likely not a valid marker of the
emotional reactivity construct (see Preece et al., 2017) because this subscale does not
distinguish between negative reactivity and positive reactivity (that is, reactivity with respect
to negative emotions and reactivity with respect to positive emotions), which researchers
using dedicated emotional reactivity measures have found to be separable dimensions that are
negatively correlated with each other (e.g., Becerra et al., 2017; Ripper et al., 2018). Indeed,
in factor analysis, the BVAQ DEMO subscale does not load on the same factors as other
emotional reactivity questionnaires (Preece et al., 2017). Thus, even for clinicians and
researchers who want to measure alexithymia and emotional reactivity, available evidence
suggests that the BVAQ is not an efficient measure.
Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire
To provide an alexithymia measure that meets all three of the abovementioned
measurement criteria, we have developed the PAQ. The PAQ is intended for clinicians and
researchers who want to work within the framework of the attention-appraisal model (Preece
et al., 2017) and assess alexithymia in adults and adolescents. It is a 24-item self-report
measure, with all items comprised of a statement designed to assess the DIF, DDF, or EOT
components of alexithymia. Respondents answer each item on a 7-point Likert scale, ranging
from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree), with higher scores indicating higher levels of
alexithymia. We used a 7-point Likert scale format because it is common in emotional
assessment tools (e.g., Emotion Regulation Questionnaire [ERQ]; Gross & John, 2003) and
there is some evidence that 7-point Likert scales perform better than 5-point (or less) scales
when measuring a continuous construct like alexithymia (e.g., Preston & Colman, 2000). In
line with the recommendations of van Sonderen et al. (2013) and others (e.g., Rodebaugh,
Woods, & Heimberg, 2007), no items are reverse-scored.
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All items corresponding to the appraisal stage of emotion valuation (i.e., the DIF and
DDF components) account for valence, and are designed to assess people’s ability to appraise
either negative or positive emotions; thus all DIF and DDF items begin with some variant of
the phrase “When I’m feeling bad, …” or “When I’m feeling good, ...”. The intention of this
phrasing style is to describe an undifferentiated unpleasant or pleasant state that reflects how
people with a low developmental level of emotional awareness experience emotions (Lane &
Schwartz, 1987). The remainder of the item then describes one’s ability to move beyond this
low developmental level (e.g., “When I’m feeling bad, I can’t tell whether I’m sad, scared, or
angry” or “When I’m feeling good, I can’t find the right words to describe those feelings”).
Respondents who agree with these DIF and DDF items are therefore indicating that, during
the appraisal stage of emotion valuation, they operate at a low developmental level. For all
items corresponding to the attention stage of emotion valuation (i.e., the EOT component) we
do not specify a valence. This is because, as aforementioned, it is not until the appraisal stage
of emotion valuation that a valence judgement is made (Gross, 2015a; Ochsner & Gross,
2014; Preece et al., 2017). To maximise the measurement distinction between the attention
and appraisal stages, our EOT items therefore include no valence appraisal and measure
people’s tendency to not focus attention on their emotions in the first place (e.g., “I prefer to
just let my emotions happen in the background, rather than focus on them” or “I don’t pay
attention to my emotions”).
We structured the 24-item PAQ so that there is an equal number of items (8 items)
corresponding to the DIF, DDF, and EOT components of the construct. This number of items
was selected with a view to achieving high levels of reliability, whilst keeping the measure
reasonably brief. Because the DIF and DDF components feature negatively and positively
valanced items, half their items correspond to negative feelings and half correspond to
positive feelings. Five subscale scores can therefore be derived (see Table 7.2): Negative-
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Difficulty identifying feelings (N-DIF; 4 items, e.g., “When I’m feeling bad, I get confused
about what emotion it is”), Positive-Difficulty identifying feelings (P-DIF; 4 items, e.g.,
“When I’m feeling good, I can’t tell whether I’m happy, excited, or amused”), NegativeDifficulty describing feelings (N-DDF; 4 items, e.g., “When something bad happens, it’s hard
for me to put into words how I’m feeling”), Positive-Difficulty describing feelings (P-DDF; 4
items, e.g., “When I’m feeling good, I can’t talk about those feelings in much depth or
detail”), and General-Externally orientated thinking (G-EOT, 8 items, e.g., “I prefer to focus
on things I can actually see or touch, rather than my emotions”).
The five subscales of the PAQ are, furthermore, designed to be combined into a
number of theoretically meaningful composite scores (see Table 7.2). To generate overall
markers of DIF or DDF, generalised across both valence types, the N-DIF and P-DIF
subscales can be combined into a General-Difficulty identifying feelings composite (G-DIF, 8
items), and the N-DDF and P-DDF subscales can be combined into a General-Difficulty
describing feelings composite (G-DDF, 8 items). Moreover, because DIF and DDF are
hypothesised to be particularly closely linked (i.e., both correspond to the appraisal stage of
emotion valuation), broader scores reflecting the appraisal stage can be derived. The N-DIF
and N-DDF subscales can be combined into a Negative-Difficulty appraising feelings
composite (N-DAF, 8 items), the P-DIF and P-DDF subscales can be combined into a
Positive-Difficulty appraising feelings composite (P-DAF, 8 items), and the N-DIF, N-DDF,
P-DIF, and P-DDF subscales can all be combined into a General-Difficulty appraising
feelings composite (G-DAF, 16 items). Lastly, to produce an overall marker of alexithymia,
all five subscales can be combined into an Alexithymia composite (ALEXI, 24 items).
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Table 7.2
A List of the Subscale and Composite Scores that can be Derived from the PAQ
No.
of
items

Content measured

N-DIF

4

Difficulty identifying, understanding, and differentiating between one’s own negative feelings.

P-DIF

4

Difficulty identifying, understanding, and differentiating between one’s own positive feelings.

N-DDF

4

Difficulty describing and communicating one’s own negative feelings.

P-DDF

4

Difficulty describing and communicating one’s own positive feelings.

G-EOT

8

Tendency to not focus attention on one’s own emotions (negative and positive).

G-DIF

8

G-DDF

8

Difficulty identifying, understanding, and differentiating between one’s own feelings (negative
and positive).
Difficulty describing and communicating one’s own feelings (negative and positive).

N-DAF

8

Difficulty identifying and describing (i.e., appraising) one’s own negative feelings.

P-DAF

8

Difficulty identifying and describing (i.e., appraising) one’s own positive feelings.

G-DAF

16

ALEXI

24

Difficulty identifying and describing (i.e., appraising) one’s own feelings (negative and
positive).
Overall alexithymia; difficulty focusing attention on and appraising one’s own feelings
(negative and positive).

Name
Subscales

Composites

Note. PAQ = Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire, N-DIF = Negative-Difficulty identifying feelings, P-DIF =
Positive-Difficulty identifying feelings, N-DDF = Negative-Difficulty describing feelings, P-DDF =
Positive-Difficulty describing feelings, G-EOT = General-Externally orientated thinking, G-DIF = GeneralDifficulty identifying feelings, G-DDF = General-Difficulty describing feelings, N-DAF = NegativeDifficulty appraising feelings, P-DAF = Positive-Difficulty appraising feelings, G-DAF = GeneralDifficulty appraising feelings, ALEXI = alexithymia.

Psychometric studies of the Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire
We report the results of two psychometric studies of the PAQ here. Study 1 describes
the item selection process and examines the factor structure and internal consistency
reliability of the measure. Study 2 replicates this examination of factor structure and internal
consistency reliability in another sample, and then examines concurrent and discriminant
validity.
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Study 1
Method
Participants and procedure. Study 1’s sample was comprised of 231 adults (65.4%
female) with a mean age of 41.52 years (SD = 16.93, range = 18-85). 16 All participants were
English speaking residents of Australia, with 73.6% reporting Australia as their country of
birth. For 32.9% their highest level of completed education was high school, for 29.9% it was
a technical diploma, and for 36.8% it was a university degree. Participants were recruited via
three avenues: an online survey recruiting company (Qualtrics panels), an advertisement on a
social media website, or an advertisement on the unit website of an undergraduate
psychology unit. About one quarter (25.5%) of the sample were current university students.
The PAQ was administered as part of an anonymous online survey. We administered
it in an over-inclusive 66-item “development” form in Study 1 to provide us with a large pool
of items to select from. We wrote 22 items designed to measure DIF, 22 items designed to
measure DDF, and 22 items designed to measure EOT (see Appendix D). For the DIF and
DDF components, there were negatively and positively valenced versions of each item (e.g.,
“When I’m feeling bad, I can’t make sense of those feelings” and “When I’m feeling good, I
can’t make sense of those feelings). Based on some preliminary exploratory factor analyses
(EFAs) and confirmatory factor analyses (CFAs) on different clusters of these items, 17 we
selected 24 to form the final PAQ (results from these preliminary analyses are not reported in
16

Some additional participants also completed the online survey. However, their data was excluded during
quality screening because they failed an attention check question and/or completed the survey impossibly
quickly (i.e., at a rate of < 2 seconds per question, suggesting inattentive responding).
17
Because at least five participants per variable in the analysis are usually required to conduct a robust factor
analysis (e.g., Gorsuch, 1983; Kline, 1979), and we had 231 participants, in our preliminary analyses we
analysed smaller clusters of items rather than analysing all 66 items together (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988;
Raubenheimer, 2004). Our first EFA included the first 33 of these 66 items, and our second EFA included the
last 33 items. CFAs were also conducted on these item clusters, principally to maximise the goodness-of-fit of
the factor solution by identifying and excluding those items that had pronounced covariances between their error
terms. A group of 24 items that performed well in these analyses were then selected as candidates for retention
and subjected to another EFA. Following this, our main (rather than preliminary) analyses were a series of
CFAs on these 24 items, the results of which are presented in Study 1.
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this paper, but some are provided in Appendix D). Item selection was based on three criteria.
Firstly, to properly capture the breadth of the alexithymia construct, we wanted the DIF, DDF
and EOT components to be evenly represented in the measure (i.e., 8 items per component).
Secondly, so that valence-specific comparisons could be made, for the DIF and DDF
components, we wanted an equal number of negative and positive items. We also wanted the
negative and positive versions of each subscale to have the same item content except for their
valence-specific terms. In other words, if we selected an item for the P-DIF subscale (e.g.,
“When I’m feeling good, I get confused about what emotion it is”) its equivalently worded
item for the N-DIF subscale (e.g., “When I’m feeling bad, I get confused about what emotion
it is”) would also need to be selected. Thirdly, we required that all retained items load
strongly (factor loading >.40) on their intended factor and not cross-load over multiple
factors (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988; Raubenheimer, 2004). Whilst 66 PAQ items were
administered, in this paper we report the results of analyses that include only the 24 retained
items.
Materials.
Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire. The PAQ is a 24-item self-report measure of
alexithymia. It is freely available for use and is provided in Appendix A.
Analytic strategy. CFAs were conducted using AMOS 24. All other analyses were
conducted using SPSS 24. All 24 PAQ items were reasonably normally distributed (max
skewness = .86, max kurtosis = -1.24).
Descriptive statistics. Means and standard deviations were calculated for the 24-item
PAQ’s subscale and composite scores. To examine whether emotional valence (negative or
positive) influenced the extent of people’s appraisal difficulties, a paired t-test was conducted
to compare N-DAF and P-DAF scores. Because people are generally driven by hedonistic
motivations to obtain pleasure and avoid pain (Gross, 2014), and some variance in

19

alexithymia is accounted for by avoidant defences (Preece et al., 2017), these avoidant
defences are likely to be applied more so to negative feelings, so we expected that people
would report more difficulties appraising negative feelings than positive feelings.
Factor structure. The factor structure of the 24-item PAQ was examined via a series
of CFAs. CFAs were conducted using maximum likelihood estimation based on a Pearson
covariance matrix. The 24 retained PAQ items were used as the observed variables. Six
theoretically informed models of increasing complexity were examined (see Figure 7.1).
(1) Model 1 was a 1-factor model, where all 24 items were specified to load on a
“general alexithymia” factor. (2) Model 2 was a 2-factor correlated model, where a
distinction between the attention and appraisal stages of emotion valuation was made; items
were specified to load on “G-EOT” or “G-DAF” factors. These two factors were allowed to
correlate. (3) Model 3 was a 3-factor correlated model, where a distinction was made between
the DIF, DDF and EOT components of alexithymia, but no distinction was made based on
valence; items were specified to load on “G-EOT”, “G-DIF” or “G-DDF” factors. All these
factors were allowed to correlate. (4) Model 4 was an alternate 3-factor correlated model,
where a distinction was made based on valence, but the DIF and DDF components of
alexithymia were not separated; items were specified to load on “G-EOT”, “N-DAF” or “PDAF” factors. All these factors were allowed to correlate. (5) Model 5 was a 5-factor
correlated model that reflected the intended subscale structure of the PAQ, whereby a
distinction was made based on valence, and a distinction was made between the DIF, DDF
and EOT components of alexithymia; items were specified to load on “G-EOT”, “N-DIF”,
“P-DIF”, “N-DDF” or “P-DDF” factors. All these factors were allowed to correlate. (6)
Model 5b was a bifactor model version of Model 5 (Gignac et al., 2007; Reise, 2012). All
items were specified to load on a broad “general alexithymia” factor, as well as load on one
of five narrow factors (“G-EOT”, “N-DIF”, “P-DIF”, “N-DDF” or “P-DDF”) that
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corresponded to the five intended subscales. Those narrow factors designed to measure the
same emotional valence were allowed to correlate (i.e., “N-DIF” and “N-DDF”; “P-DIF” and
“P-DDF”), as were those narrow factors designed to measure the same component of
appraisal (i.e., “N-DIF” and “P-DIF”; “N-DDF” and “P-DDF”). Bifactor models are
appropriate when a measure is designed to “primarily reflect a strong common trait [e.g.,
alexithymia], but there is multidimensionality caused by well-defined clusters of items from
diverse subdomains” (Reise, 2012, p. 692), which is the case for the PAQ, so we expected
Model 5b would be the best fitting solution.
The goodness-of-fit of the CFA models was judged based on the pattern of factor
loadings and factor intercorrelations within each model, and via four fit indexes: the
comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker Lewis index (TLI), root mean square error of
approximation (RMSEA), and standardised root mean residual (SRMR). CFI and TLI values
>.90 were judged to indicate acceptable fit, as were RMSEA and SRMR values < .08
(Bentler & Bonnet, 1980; Browne & Cudeck, 1992; Marsh et al., 2004). To directly compare
the fit of the models, the Akaike information criterion (AIC) was also used; AIC penalises
more complex models, and lower values indicate a better fitting model (Byrne, 2013). Factor
loadings >.40 were considered meaningful loadings (Stevens, 1992).
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Figure 7.1. The confirmatory factor analysis models assessed in Study 1 and Study 2; Models 1, 2, 3,
4, 5, and 5b. Squares indicate item numbers, ellipses indicate latent factors. Item error terms are not
displayed. N-DIF = Negative-Difficulty identifying feelings, P-DIF = Positive-Difficulty identifying
feelings, N-DDF = Negative-Difficulty describing feelings, P-DDF = Positive-Difficulty describing
feelings, G-EOT = General-Externally orientated thinking, G-DIF = General-Difficulty identifying
feelings, G-DDF = General-Difficulty describing feelings, N-DAF = Negative-Difficulty appraising
feelings, P-DAF = Positive-Difficulty appraising feelings, G-DAF = General-Difficulty appraising
feelings, gen alexi = general alexithymia.
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Internal consistency reliability. Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients were
calculated. Reliability coefficients >.70 were considered acceptable, >.80 were considered
good, and >.90 were considered excellent (Groth-Marnat, 2009).
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 7.3. As predicted,
participants reported significantly more difficulties appraising negative feelings (N-DAF; M
= 29.28, SD = 11.72) than positive feelings (P-DAF; M = 23.17, SD = 10.52), t (230) = 10.12,
p < .001.
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Table 7.3
Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach’s Alpha Reliability Coefficients for the Administered
Measures in Study 1 and Study 2
Measure/subscale
PAQ
Subscales
N-DIF
P-DIF
N-DDF
P-DDF
G-EOT
Composites
G-DIF
G-DDF
N-DAF
P-DAF
G-DAF
ALEXI

M

Total
SD
range
α
Study 1

Females
M
SD

Males
M

SD

13.51
10.64
15.78
12.53
26.43

5.87
5.10
6.67
6.01
10.65

4-28
4-28
4-28
4-28
8-56

.87
.88
.90
.91
.90

13.79
10.55
15.92
12.15
25.43

6.12
5.37
7.00
6.03
10.83

12.96
10.81
15.50
13.25
28.31

5.37
4.57
6.04
5.94
10.08

24.15
28.30
29.28
23.17
52.45
78.88

9.93
11.57
11.72
10.52
20.29
28.34

8-56
8-56
8-56
8-56
16-112
24-168

.90
.92
.93
.93
.95
.95

24.34
28.07
29.72
22.70
52.41
77.84

10.46
11.99
12.33
10.98
21.46
29.96

23.78
28.75
28.46
24.06
52.53
80.84

8.90
10.78
10.50
9.58
18.00
25.06

Study 2
PAQ
Subscales
N-DIF
P-DIF
N-DDF
P-DDF
G-EOT
Composites
G-DIF
G-DDF
N-DAF
P-DAF
G-DAF
ALEXI

13.38
11.30
15.35
12.97
28.97

6.41
5.76
6.89
6.12
11.19

4-28
4-28
4-28
4-28
8-56

.89
.89
.91
.90
.90

14.03
11.38
15.80
12.72
27.92

6.57
6.08
7.00
6.24
11.35

12.28
11.18
14.60
13.38
30.74

5.98
5.20
6.63
5.90
10.72

23.68
28.32
28.73
24.27
52.99
81.97

11.28
12.16
12.71
11.39
22.58
30.91

8-56
8-56
8-56
8-56
16-112
24-168

.92
.93
.94
.94
.96
.96

25.41
28.52
29.83
24.10
53.93
81.84

11.57
12.30
13.07
11.95
23.23
31.92

23.45
27.98
26.88
24.55
51.43
82.17

10.68
11.92
11.89
10.41
21.39
29.15

DASS-21
Depression
Anxiety
Stress
Total scale

5.87
4.40
6.17
16.44

5.89
4.85
5.38
14.86

0-21
0-21
0-21
0-63

.94
.89
.92
.96

6.63
4.92
6.99
18.54

6.14
5.06
5.55
15.37

4.59
3.54
4.80
12.93

5.21
4.34
4.79
13.28

ERQ
Reappraisal
Suppression

28.80
15.78

7.19
5.28

6-42
4-28

.89
.78

28.95
15.33

7.60
5.57

28.56
16.54

6.46
4.68

Note. Study 1 data includes 231 participants (151 females, 80 males) and Study 2 data includes
748 participants (468 females, 280 males). PAQ = Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire, DASS-21 =
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21, ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, N-DIF =
Negative-Difficulty identifying feelings, P-DIF = Positive-Difficulty identifying feelings, N-DDF
= Negative-Difficulty describing feelings, P-DDF = Positive-Difficulty describing feelings, GEOT = General-Externally orientated thinking, G-DIF = General-Difficulty identifying feelings,
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G-DDF = General-Difficulty describing feelings, N-DAF = Negative-Difficulty appraising
feelings, P-DAF = Positive-Difficulty appraising feelings, G-DAF = General-Difficulty appraising
feelings, ALEXI = alexithymia.

Factor structure. All CFA fit indexes indicated that those models featuring the five
intended subscales as factors (i.e., Model 5 and Model 5b) were a good fit to the data and the
best models we tested. For CFA fit index values, factor loadings, and factor intercorrelations,
see Tables 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6, respectively.
The one-factor model (Model 1) was a poor fit to the data according to all examined
fit indexes, suggesting that the PAQ was measuring a multidimensional construct. The twofactor model (Model 2) displayed better fit than Model 1, indicating that making a broad
distinction between the attention and appraisal stages of emotion valuation added value to
the factor solution. In turn, Model 3, which further separated the appraisal stage into its DIF
and DDF components, displayed better fit than Model 2. Thus, whilst the “G-DIF” and “GDDF” factors in Model 3 were very highly correlated (estimated r = .86), there was some
statistical value in separating them. Overall though, the models that did not account for
emotional valence (i.e., Model 1, Model 2, Model 3) exhibited poor fit index values. Our
CFAs therefore emphasised that it was statistically useful to distinguish between the appraisal
of negative emotions and the appraisal positive emotions. Model 4, for example, produced
much better fit indexes than Model 3, indicating that, with respect to the appraisal stage, it
was statistically more important to account for valence than it was to distinguish between DIF
and DDF. The superiority of Model 5 over Models 3 and 4, nonetheless, highlighted that
making all these distinctions (i.e., distinguishing between the attention and appraisal stages of
emotion valuation, distinguishing between the DIF and DDF components of appraisal, and
distinguishing between the appraisal of negative and positive emotions) added value to the
factor solution. All items loaded well on their intended factor in Model 5, and all five factors
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were strongly positively correlated (estimated rs = 54 to .88). In Model 5b, the addition of the
broad “general alexithymia” factor into the factor solution improved fit further. Item variance
was generally split between the broad factor and the narrow factors, with most items loading
more so on the broad factor (see Table 7.5). There was therefore statistical support for the
presence of a strong “general alexithymia” factor, as well as statistical support for five
narrow factors reflecting the subdomains (i.e., the subscales) of the multidimensional
alexithymia construct (Reise, 2012). The 24-item PAQ, hence, had a factor structure that was
consistent with its theoretical basis in this data-set.
Table 7.4
Goodness-of-Fit Index Values from Confirmatory Factor Analyses of the 24 PAQ Items in
Study 1 and Study 2
Model

χ2 (df)

CFI

TLI

RMSEA (90% CI)

SRMR

AIC

Study 1
Model 1

1611.636 (252)

.671

.639

.153 (.146-.160)

.1041

1707.636

Model 2

1191.319 (251)

.772

.750

.128 (.120-.135)

.0835

1289.319

Model 3

1059.520 (249)

.804

.782

.119 (.112-.126)

.0782

1161.520

Model 4

739.385 (249)

.881

.868

.093 (.085-.100)

.0618

841.385

Model 5

479.035 (242)

.943

.935

.065 (.057-.074)

.0504

595.035

Model 5b

441.586 (224)

.947

.935

.065 (.056-.074)

.0550

593.586

Study 2
Model 1

4067.055 (252)

.731

.705

.142 (.139-.146)

.0938

4163.055

Model 2

2672.916 (251)

.829

.812

.114 (.110-.118)

.0627

2770.916

Model 3

2452.332 (249)

.845

.828

.109 (.105-.113)

.0607

2554.332

Model 4

1584.897 (249)

.906

.896

.085 (.081-.089)

.0469

1686.897

Model 5

1164.626 (242)

.935

.926

.071 (.067-.076)

.0422

1280.626

Model 5b

1007.574 (224)

.945

.932

.068 (.064-.073)

.0381

1159.574

Note. For all examined models χ2 p < .001. CFI = comparative fit index, TLI = Tucker Lewis index,
RMSEA = root mean square error of approximation, SRMR = standardised root mean residual, AIC
= Akaike information criterion, CI = confidence interval.
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Table 7.5
Standardised Item Factor Loadings from Confirmatory Factor Analyses of the 24 PAQ Items in Study 1 and
Study 2; Loadings are Displayed for Model 5 and Model 5b
Study 1
Factor/item

Study 2

Model
5

Model
5b

Model
5

Model
5b

2-When I’m feeling bad, I can’t tell whether I’m sad, angry, or scared.

.72

.48(.53)

.78

.57(.55)

8-When I’m feeling bad, I can’t make sense of those feelings.

.82

.55(.62)

.84

.58(.62)

14- When I’m feeling bad, I get confused about what emotion it is.

.88

.59(.66)

.88

.52(.70)

20-When I’m feeling bad, I’m puzzled by those feelings.

.77

.58(.52)

.80

.50(.62)

5-When I’m feeling good, I can’t tell whether I’m happy, excited, or amused.

.66

.56(.36)

.77

.60(.59)

11-When I’m feeling good, I can’t make sense of those feelings.

.86

.68(.53)

.84

.38(.75)

17- When I’m feeling good, I get confused about what emotion it is.

.89

.67(.57)

.85

.37(.75)

23- When I’m feeling good, I’m puzzled by those feelings.

.79

.63(.45)

.83

.23(.80)

1-When I’m feeling bad (feeling an unpleasant emotion), I can’t find the right words to describe those feelings.

.79

.22(.76)

.82

.53(.64)

7-When I’m feeling bad, I can’t talk about those feelings in much depth or detail.

.85

.14(.83)

.82

.43(.68)

13-When something bad happens, it’s hard for me to put into words how I’m feeling.

.86

.02*(.87)

.88

.53(.70)

19-When I’m feeling bad, if I try to describe how I’m feeling I don’t know what to say.

.88

.26(.84)

.89

.48(.74)

4- When I’m feeling good (feeling a pleasant emotion), I can’t find the right words to describe those feelings.

.79

.50(.60)

.78

.60(.63)

10- When I’m feeling good, I can’t talk about those feelings in much depth or detail.

.86

.51(.69)

.81

.11(.82)

16- When something good happens, it’s hard for me to put into words how I’m feeling.

.85

.54(.66)

.86

.31(.80)

22- When I’m feeling good, if I try to describe how I’m feeling I don’t know what to say.

.90

.54(.72)

.87

.27(.82)

3-I tend to ignore how I feel.

.68

.35(.59)

.71

.46(.53)

6-I prefer to just let my feelings happen in the background, rather than focus on them.

.75

.59(.48)

.67

.50(.44)

9-I don’t pay attention to my emotions.

.56

.45(.35)

.80

.67(.50)

12-Usually, I try to avoid thinking about what I’m feeling.

.86

.61(.60)

.77

.44(.62)

15-I prefer to focus on things I can actually see or touch, rather than my emotions.

.78

.56(.55)

.69

.47(.50)

18-I don’t try to be ‘in touch’ with my emotions.

.83

.67(.52)

.77

.57(.53)

21-It’s not important for me to know what I’m feeling.

.59

.46(.38)

.64

.46(.45)

24-It’s strange for me to think about my emotions.

.78

.47(.62)

.81

.50(.65)

N-DIF

P-DIF

N-DDF

P-DDF

G-EOT

Note. *p >.05. For the bifactor model (Model 5b), factor loadings inside the brackets are loadings on the broad
“general alexithymia” factor, and factor loadings outside the brackets are loadings on the narrow “N-DIF”, “N-DDF”,
“P-DIF”, “P-DDF” or “G-EOT” factor. N-DIF = Negative-Difficulty identifying feelings, P-DIF = Positive-Difficulty
identifying feelings, N-DDF = Negative-Difficulty describing feelings, P-DDF = Positive-Difficulty describing
feelings, G-EOT = General-Externally orientated thinking.
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Table 7.6
Estimated Correlations Between the PAQ Factors in the Examined Confirmatory Factor
Analysis Models in Study 1 and Study 2

F1

F2

Factor
F3

Model 2
F1 “G-DAF”
F2 “G-EOT”

.69*

.68*
-

-

-

-

Model 3
F1 “G-DIF”
F2 “G-DDF”
F3 “G-EOT”

.86*
.62*

.92*
.70*

.64*
.69*
-

-

-

Model 4
F1 “N-DAF”
F2 “P-DAF”
F3 “G-EOT”

.71*
.65*

.80*
.63*

.63*
.66*
-

-

-

Model 5
F1 “N-DIF”
F2 “P-DIF”
F3 “N-DDF”
F4 “P-DDF”
F5 “G-EOT”

.73*
.84*
.61*
.54*

.80*
.56*
.88*
.59*

.92*
.71*
.73*
.68*

.74*
.93*
.82*
.62*

.58*
.63*
.65*
.67*
-

Model 5b
F1 “N-DIF”
F2 “P-DIF”
F3 “N-DDF”
F4 “P-DDF”
F5 “G-EOT”
F6 “gen alexi”

.52*
.95*
-

.36*
.80*
-

.78*
-.28
-

.70*
.26*
-

-

F4

F5

Note. *p < .05. Values below the diagonal are for Study 1, those above the diagonal are for Study 2.
Model 5b was a bifactor model, correlations were not specified between some of the factors. PAQ =
Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire, N-DIF = Negative-Difficulty identifying feelings, P-DIF =
Positive-Difficulty identifying feelings, N-DDF = Negative-Difficulty describing feelings, P-DDF =
Positive-Difficulty describing feelings, G-EOT = General-Externally orientated thinking, G-DIF =
General-Difficulty identifying feelings, G-DDF = General-Difficulty describing feelings, N-DAF =
Negative-Difficulty appraising feelings, P-DAF = Positive-Difficulty appraising feelings, G-DAF =
General-Difficulty appraising feelings, gen alexi = general alexithymia.
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Internal consistency reliability. As displayed in Table 7.3, all subscale scores had
good to excellent internal consistency reliability (α = .87 to .91) and all composite scores had
excellent internal consistency reliability (α = .90 to .95).
Study 2
Method
Participants and procedure. To replicate and extend the results of Study 1, the 24item PAQ was subsequently administered to a new sample. This sample was comprised of
748 adults (62.6% females) with a mean age of 47.57 years (SD = 17.29, range = 18-88). 18
Participants were recruited via an online survey recruiting company (Qualtrics panels). All
participants were English speaking residents of Australia, with 75% born in Australia. The
highest level of completed education for 37% of the sample was high school, for 34.6% it
was a technical diploma, and for 26.8% it was a university degree. About one tenth (9.4%) of
the sample were current university students. The PAQ was administered as part of a battery
of psychological questionnaires in an anonymous online survey.
Materials. The battery included the PAQ, the ERQ (Gross & John, 2003), and the
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21 (DASS-21; Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).
Emotion Regulation Questionnaire. The ERQ (Gross & John, 2003) is a 10-item
self-report measure of people’s usage of two emotion regulation strategies; Cognitive
reappraisal (6 items, e.g., “When I’m faced with a stressful situation, I make myself think
about it in a way that helps me stay calm”) and Expressive suppression (4 items, e.g., “I
control my emotions by not expressing them”). Items are answered on a 7-point Likert scale
ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) with higher scores indicating greater

18

Some additional participants also completed the online survey, however their data was excluded during
quality screening because they failed an attention check question and/or completed the survey impossibly
quickly (i.e., at a rate of < 2 seconds per question, suggesting inattentive responding).

29

use of that strategy. Cognitive reappraisal is usually associated with adaptive outcomes, and
expressive suppression is associated with maladaptive outcomes; hence, low cognitive
reappraisal scores and high expressive suppression scores are indicative of emotion
regulation difficulties (Gross & John, 2003). The ERQ has demonstrated good validity and
reliability (Gross & John, 2003).
Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21. The DASS-21 (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995) is
a 21-item self-report measure of Depression (7 items, e.g., “I felt that life was meaningless”),
Anxiety (7 items, e.g., “I felt I was close to panic”), and Stress (7 items, e.g., “I found it hard
to wind down”) symptoms experienced in the past week. All items can be summed into a
Total scale score representing overall levels of psychological distress (Kia-Keating et al.,
2017). Items are answered on a 4-point Likert scale ranging from 0 to 3, with higher scores
indicating more severe symptomatology. The DASS-21 has demonstrated good validity and
reliability (Lovibond & Lovibond, 1995).
Analytic strategy. Descriptive statistics were calculated, and N-DAF and P-DAF
scores were compared in the same manner as Study 1. All 24 PAQ items were reasonably
normally distributed (max skewness = .82, max kurtosis = -1.23).
Factor structure and internal consistency reliability. The factor structure and
internal consistency reliability of the PAQ was examined in the same manner as Study 1.
Concurrent validity. Pearson correlations were calculated between PAQ scores and
ERQ/DASS-21 scores. Because alexithymia is a deficit in the emotion valuation process, and
this valuation process is responsible for activating emotion regulation attempts, alexithymia is
a “crucial rate-limiting factor” for successful emotion regulation (Gross, 2014, p. 13) so we
expected that high PAQ scores would be associated with a more maladaptive emotion
regulation profile on the ERQ (i.e., lower use of cognitive reappraisal, higher use of
expressive suppression) and higher levels of depression, anxiety, and stress on the DASS-21.
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Discriminant validity. Discriminant validity was examined via a second-order EFA
(principal axis factoring using direct oblimin rotation) using the PAQ and DASS-21 subscale
scores as the observed variables. Factors were extracted based on the scree-plot method
(Fabrigar et al., 1999). Our purpose here was to establish whether the PAQ was measuring a
latent construct (i.e., alexithymia) that was statistically separable from people’s current level
of psychological distress. As abovementioned, people’s overall level of alexithymia should
correlate with their current level of distress, but conceptually alexithymia and distress are still
separable constructs (Preece et al., 2017; Taylor et al., 1999). We therefore expected all five
PAQ subscales to load on a “general alexithymia” factor and all three DASS-21 subscales to
load on a separate “psychological distress” factor. This analysis was motivated by results
from several recent studies (e.g., Leising et al., 2009; Marchesi et al., 2014), which found that
some existing alexithymia measures have poor discriminant validity with measures of
distress.
Results and discussion
Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics are reported in Table 7.3. Like Study 1,
consistent with our expectations, participants reported significantly more difficulties
appraising negative feelings (N-DAF; M = 28.73, SD = 12.71) than positive feelings (P-DAF;
M = 24.27, SD = 11.39), t (747) = 14.26, p < .001.
Factor structure. The pattern of CFA findings was the same as Study 1. CFAs of the
24 PAQ items indicated that Model 5 and Model 5b were, again, good fits to the data and the
best of the models we tested. For CFA fit index values, factor loadings, and factor
intercorrelations, see Tables 7.4, 7.5, and 7.6, respectively. In Model 5, all items loaded
strongly on their intended factor and all five factors were significantly positively correlated.
Model 5b produced the best fit index values overall, suggesting that the factor structure of the
PAQ was well represented by a broad “general alexithymia” factor, and five narrow factors
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corresponding to the intended subscales of the PAQ. The PAQ therefore had a factor
structure that was consistent with its theoretical basis in this data-set.
Internal consistency reliability. Like Study 1, all subscale scores had good to
excellent levels of internal consistency reliability (α = .89 to .91) and all composite scores
had excellent internal consistency reliability (α = .92 to .96; see Table 7.3).
Concurrent validity. Supporting the concurrent validity of the PAQ, people reporting
higher levels of alexithymia on the PAQ also tended to report more emotion regulation
problems on the ERQ (i.e., higher usage of expressive suppression, lower usage of cognitive
reappraisal) and a higher level of depression, anxiety, and stress symptoms on the DASS-21
(see Table 7.7).

32

Table 7.7
Pearson Correlations Between the PAQ and DASS-21/ERQ in Study 2

Measure/subscale
PAQ
Subscales
N-DIF
P-DIF
N-DDF
P-DDF
G-EOT
Composites
G-DIF
G-DDF
N-DAF
P-DAF
G-DAF
ALEXI

Depression

DASS-21
Anxiety Stress

Total

ERQ
Reappraisal Suppression

.51*
.44*
.50*
.43*
.28*

.52*
.46*
.44*
.40*
.24*

.54*
.43*
.48*
.38*
.21*

.57*
.48*
.51*
.44*
.26*

-.17*
-.17*
-.14*
-.12*
-.06

.33*
.38*
.41*
.46*
.55*

.51*
.50*
.53*
.45*
.52*
.48*

.53*
.45*
.50*
.45*
.51*
.45*

.53*
.47*
.53*
.43*
.52*
.45*

.57*
.51*
.56*
.48*
.56*
.50*

-.18*
-.14*
-.16*
-.15*
-.17*
-.14*

.38*
.46*
.39*
.44*
.44*
.52*

Note. *p < .05. PAQ = Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire, DASS-21 = Depression Anxiety Stress
Scales-21, ERQ = Emotion Regulation Questionnaire, N-DIF = Negative-Difficulty identifying
feelings, P-DIF = Positive-Difficulty identifying feelings, N-DDF = Negative-Difficulty describing
feelings, P-DDF = Positive-Difficulty describing feelings, G-EOT = General-Externally orientated
thinking, G-DIF = General-Difficulty identifying feelings, G-DDF = General-Difficulty describing
feelings, N-DAF = Negative-Difficulty appraising feelings, P-DAF = Positive-Difficulty appraising
feelings, G-DAF = General-Difficulty appraising feelings, ALEXI = alexithymia.

Discriminant validity. Consistent with our expectations, the second-order EFA of the
PAQ and DASS-21 subscale scores extracted two factors, accounting for 78.91% of the
variance in subscale scores (see Table 7.8). Factor 1 (eigenvalue = 4.86), which we call
“general alexithymia”, consisted of all five PAQ subscales. Factor 2 (eigenvalue = 1.46),
which we call “psychological distress”, consisted of all three DASS-21 subscales. All
subscale scores loaded strongly on their primary factor with no cross-loadings, suggesting
that the PAQ subscale scores were successfully measuring a latent construct that was
statistically separable from people’s current level of psychological distress.
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Table 7.8
Factor Loadings from a Second-Order Exploratory Factor Analysis of the PAQ
and DASS-21 Subscale Scores in Study 2 to Examine Discriminant Validity

Measure/
subscale
PAQ
N-DIF
P-DIF
N-DDF
P-DDF
G-EOT
DASS-21
Depression
Anxiety
Stress

Factor 1
“general alexithymia”

Factor 2
“psychological distress”

.72
.82
.80
.90
.74

.22
.06
.11
-.03
-.12

.08
.01
-.03

.80
.88
.94

Note. Principal axis factoring with direct oblimin rotation was used. Factor loadings >
.40 are in boldface. The correlation between factor 1 and factor 2 was .52. PAQ =
Perth Alexithymia Questionnaire, DASS-21 = Depression Anxiety Stress Scales-21,
N-DIF = Negative-Difficulty identifying feelings, P-DIF = Positive-Difficulty
identifying feelings, N-DDF = Negative-Difficulty describing feelings, P-DDF =
Positive-Difficulty describing feelings, G-EOT = General-Externally orientated
thinking.

General discussion
Our purpose in this paper was to document the development of the PAQ and examine
its psychometric properties across two studies. In both studies, the PAQ performed well on
every marker of validity and reliability that we tested.
The factor structure of the PAQ was replicable and consistent with its theoretical basis
(Preece et al., 2017). All 24 items loaded cleanly onto one of five narrow factors, which
corresponded to the five subscales we intended the measure to have (N-DIF, P-DIF, N-DDF,
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P-DDF, G-EOT), and there was also strong evidence in our bifactor CFA models for a
broader “general alexithymia” factor. The PAQ therefore appeared to assess a coherent
multidimensional construct, and could distinguish between the DIF, DDF and EOT
components of alexithymia. The DIF and DDF items were, moreover, particularly closely
linked in our factor analyses, and thus a broader distinction between the attention (EOT) and
appraisal (DIF, DDF) stages of emotion valuation was evident (see also, Erni et al., 1997;
Kooiman et al., 2002; Loas et al., 1996). Our factor analyses suggested, in fact, with respect
to measuring the appraisal stage, that it was statistically more important to distinguish
between negative and positive valence, than it was to distinguish between DIF and DDF (see
also, Barrett et al., 2001; van der Velde et al., 2013). Indeed, in both our data-sets, people
tended to report significantly more difficulties appraising negative emotions than positive
emotions. The PAQ therefore appears to provide a more nuanced assessment of alexithymia
than existing measures that do not account for emotional valence.
The PAQ also correlated with established measures of emotion regulation and
psychopathology in expected ways. High PAQ scores were associated with higher usage of
expressive suppression, lower usage of cognitive reappraisal, and higher levels of depression,
anxiety and stress symptoms. The PAQ subscales, moreover, loaded on a different higherorder factor to the DASS-21 subscales when factor analysed, and thereby demonstrated a
form of discriminant validity (i.e., the PAQ is not a measure of people’s current level of
distress; see Leising et al., 2009). Whilst our conclusions about the PAQ’s clinical relevance
must be tentative given that we did not use a clinical sample, these results are consistent with
contemporary models of psychopathology (e.g., Ellard et al., 2010; Rottenberg & Johnson,
2007; Taylor et al., 1999), which consider alexithymia as a key risk factor for the
development of psychiatric symptomatology. High levels of internal consistency reliability
were also evident for all PAQ subscale and composite scores, and the excellent internal
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consistency reliability of the PAQ G-EOT subscale is of particular note given that some
previous attempts to measure EOT via self-report have had low reliability. In a similar
Australian sample to the two analysed here, for example, Preece, Becerra, Robinson and
Dandy (2018) found that the TAS-20 EOT subscale had a low Cronbach’s alpha reliability
coefficient of .64, and half the TAS-20 EOT items did not load meaningfully on the EOT
factor in factor analysis (see also, Gignac et al., 2007; Thorberg et al., 2010).
We think future research with the PAQ could consequently help enhance theoretical
understanding of the alexithymia construct and its relationship to other variables. Clinical
researchers are, for example, increasingly trying to examine alexithymia at the component
level and establish whether different psychopathology categories (e.g., Bankier et al., 2001;
Leweke et al., 2012; Marchesi et al., 2014; Lyvers et al., 2018) or brain injury categories
(e.g., Williams & Wood, 2010) have characteristic DIF, DDF and EOT profiles. To date,
however, such work has primarily used the TAS-20 and thus confident inferences about EOT,
or valence-specific deficits in DIF and DDF, have not been possible. Our data suggest that by
using the PAQ more detailed alexithymia profiles may now be obtained. 19 Pending validation
in clinical populations, such profiles could, in effect, help researchers and clinicians to better
conceptualise and treat those clinical presentations characterised by emotion processing
deficits. Patients reporting high levels of alexithymia on the PAQ are, for instance, likely to
be good candidates for psychotherapeutic interventions (e.g., Edwards, Shivaji, &
Wupperman, 2018; Neumann et al., 2017) that are designed to develop emotion schemas and
reduce usage of experiential avoidance as an emotion regulation strategy (Preece et al., 2017).

19

Because alexithymia is, statistically, a dimensional trait rather than a categorical syndrome (e.g., Mattila et al.,
2010; Parker, Eastabrook, Keefer, & Wood, 2008), to interpret PAQ profiles we think it is most appropriate for
a respondent’s scores be compared to those of an appropriate normative sample. Following common assessment
practices (e.g., Lezak et al., 2004), scores within one standard deviation of the population mean could be seen to
represent an “average” level of alexithymia, whilst scores below or above this range could be seen to represent a
“low” or “high” level of alexithymia, respectively.
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Limitations and some future directions
We think the introduction of the PAQ makes a useful contribution, but some
limitations of our studies should be noted that will require further research. Firstly, the size of
our sample in Study 1 was large enough for the factor analyses to be robust according to
commonly accepted criteria (e.g., a minimum of 100 participants and at least 5 participants
per variable in the analysis; Gorsuch, 1983; Kline, 1979), but it was a modest sample size.
Secondly, we designed the PAQ with adult, adolescent, nonclinical and clinical respondents
in mind, but our results here only apply to adults from the general community, so the
measure’s performance in clinical and adolescent samples remains to be determined. Thirdly,
we did not examine the test-retest reliability of the PAQ, so more research is required to
determine the extent to which PAQ scores are consistent over time. Fourthly, the concurrent
validity of the PAQ was explored only in relation to other self-report measures and we did
not administer any other measures of alexithymia. We ideally would have included the TAS20 and BVAQ in our Study 2 questionnaire battery, but extending the length of the battery
further was not feasible for this study. Future work should evaluate the PAQ directly against
other measures of alexithymia, which would allow for more detailed analyses of convergent
and discriminant validity. We think factor analyses of the PAQ, TAS-20 and BVAQ items
together, for example, could be particularly useful for determining how the non-valenced DIF
and DDF items of the TAS-20 and BVAQ are interpreted by participants; that is, whether
these items are interpreted as corresponding more so to negative valence, positive valence, or
some aggregate of both valence types. Such data would help researchers to better frame and
understand the existing body of alexithymia work that has so far mostly used the TAS-20 and
BVAQ.
Conclusions
Our data suggest that the PAQ has good validity and reliability as a self-report
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measure of alexithymia. Strengths of the measure include its capacity to reliably measure
each component of the construct as it is defined by the attention-appraisal model, and its
capacity to do so across negative and positive emotions. Whilst further research is needed to
confirm these findings across different population types, on present evidence, the PAQ
appears to be a useful alexithymia assessment tool.
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Table 1D
List of the 66 PAQ “Development” Items Administered in Study 1
Item content
Negative-Difficulty identifying feelings
-When I’m feeling bad, I can’t tell whether I’m sad, angry, or scared.*
-When I’m feeling bad, I can’t make sense of those feelings.*
-When I’m feeling bad, I get confused about what emotion it is.*
-When I’m feeling bad, often I don’t understand why.
-When something bad happens, often I don’t know what I’m feeling.
-When I’m feeling bad, I’m puzzled by those feelings.*
-When I’m feeling bad, it’s hard for me to recognise what those feelings are.
-When I’m feeling bad, I don’t know whether it’s an emotion or another type of physical sensation in my body.
-When I’m feeling bad, I don’t know whether that feeling is sadness, anger, or fear.
-When I’m feeling bad, it’s difficult for me to figure out what emotion I’m feeling.
-It’s hard for me to notice the difference between when I’m feeling embarrassed, guilty, or disgusted.
Positive-Difficulty identifying feelings
-When I’m feeling good, I can’t tell whether I’m sad, angry, or scared.*
-When I’m feeling good, I can’t make sense of those feelings.*
-When I’m feeling good, I get confused about what emotion it is.*
-When I’m feeling good, often I don’t understand why.
-When something good happens, often I don’t know what I’m feeling.
-When I’m feeling good, I’m puzzled by those feelings.*
-When I’m feeling good, it’s hard for me to recognise what those feelings are.
-When I’m feeling good, I don’t know whether it’s an emotion or another type of physical sensation in my body
-When I’m feeling good, I don’t know whether that feeling is joy, enthusiasm, or contentment.
-When I’m feeling good, it’s difficult for me to figure out what emotion I’m feeling.
-It’s hard for me to notice the difference between when I’m feeling proud, confident, or inspired.
Negative-Difficulty describing feelings
-When I’m feeling bad (feeling an unpleasant emotion) I can’t find the right words to describe those feelings. *
-When I’m feeling bad, I can’t talk about those feelings in much depth or detail*
-When I’m feeling bad, If I try to describe how I’m feeling I don’t know what to say. *
-When something bad happens, it’s hard for me to put into words how I’m feeling*
-When I’m feeling bad, it’s hard to communicate how I’m feeling inside.
-When I’m feeling bad, it’s hard for me to express in words what I’m feeling.
-When I’m feeling bad, I have trouble discussing those feelings.
-When I’m feeling bad, most people can describe those types of feelings in more detail than I can.
-When I don’t like something, it’s hard for me to put into words how it makes me feel.
-When I’m feeling bad, I can’t describe those feelings in a way that allows other people to properly understand.
-When I’m feeling bad, I can’t discuss those feelings properly.
Positive-Difficulty describing feelings
-When I’m feeling good (feeling a pleasant emotion) I can’t find the right words to describe those feelings. *
-When I’m feeling good, I can’t talk about those feelings in much depth or detail*
-When I’m feeling good, If I try to describe how I’m feeling I don’t know what to say. *
-When something good happens, it’s hard for me to put into words how I’m feeling*
-When I’m feeling good, it’s hard to communicate how I’m feeling inside.
-When I’m feeling good, it’s hard for me to express in words what I’m feeling
-When I’m feeling good, I have trouble discussing those feelings
-When I’m feeling good, most people can describe those types of feelings in more detail than I can
-When I like something, it’s hard for me to put into words how it makes me feel.

-When I’m feeling good, I can’t describe those feelings in a way that allows other people to properly understand
-When I’m feeling good, I can’t discuss those feelings properly
General-Externally orientated thinking
-I tend to ignore how I feel.*
-I don’t pay attention to my emotions.*
-I prefer to just let my feelings happen in the background, rather than focus on them. *
-It’s hard for me to concentrate on my feelings.
-It’s strange for me to think about my emotions.*
-It’s hard to focus my attention on the feelings inside me.
-I tend to live my life without considering how I’m feeling.
-I prefer to focus on things I can actually see or touch, rather than my emotions.*
-It’s not important for me to know what I’m feeling.*
-I don’t try to be ‘in touch’ with my emotions.*
-I prefer to ignore my feelings, rather than focus my attention on them.
-I have difficulty paying attention to my feelings.
-Usually, I try to avoid thinking about what I’m feeling.*
-I’m not interested in how I feel.
-Most people probably pay more attention to emotions than I do.
-My emotions are hardly ever the focus of my attention.
-I think most people waste too much time thinking about their feelings.
-I don’t like thinking about my feelings.
-I don’t analyse my feelings closely.
-I don’t think about my feelings much.
-Usually, I don’t try to understand my feelings.
-I don’t care about what I’m feeling.

Note. *Item retained in final version of the PAQ.

Table 2D
Factor Loadings from an Exploratory Factor Analysis of the 24 Retained PAQ Items using
the Study 1 Sample (N=231)
Subscale/ item
N-DDF
1-When I’m feeling bad (feeling an unpleasant emotion), I can’t find the right words to describe those feelings.
7-When I’m feeling bad, I can’t talk about those feelings in much depth or detail.
13-When something bad happens, it’s hard for me to put into words how I’m feeling.
19-When I’m feeling bad, if I try to describe how I’m feeling I don’t know what to say.
N-DIF
2-When I’m feeling bad, I can’t tell whether I’m sad, angry, or scared
8-When I’m feeling bad, I can’t make sense of those feelings
14-When I’m feeling bad, I get confused about what emotion it is
20- When I’m feeling bad, I’m puzzled by those feelings
P-DDF
4- When I’m feeling good (feeling a pleasant emotion), I can’t find the right words to describe those feelings
10- When I’m feeling good, I can’t talk about those feelings in much depth or detail
16- When something good happens, it’s hard for me to put into words how I’m feeling
22- When I’m feeling good, if I try to describe how I’m feeling I don’t know what to say
P-DIF
5- When I’m feeling good, I can’t tell whether I’m happy, excited, or amused
11- When I’m feeling good, I can’t make sense of those feelings
17- When I’m feeling good, I get confused about what emotion it is
23- When I’m feeling good, I’m puzzled by those feelings
G-EOT
3- I tend to ignore how I feel
6- I prefer to just let my feelings happen in the background, rather than focus on them
9- I don’t pay attention to my emotions
12- Usually, I try to avoid thinking about what I’m feeling
15- I prefer to focus on things I can actually see or touch, rather than my emotions
18- I don’t try to be ‘in touch’ with my emotions
21- It’s not important for me to know what I’m feeling
24- It’s strange for me to think about my emotions

Factor 1
“P-DAF”

Factor 2
“G-EOT”

Factor 3
“N-DAF”

.09
.01
.21
.02

.06
.26
.15
.10

-.62
-.57
-.50
-.74

.09
-.01
.09
.17

-.02
.02
.03
.03

-.67
-.83
-.82
-.64

.71
.81
.79
.84

.03
.04
.10
-.00

-.11
.04
.03
-.03

.60
.79
.69
.70

-.03
.02
.11
.12

-.11
-.08
-.17
-.00

-.00
-.08
.12
.03
-.07
-.01
.02
.17

.54
.78
.59
.82
.76
.90
.58
.62

-.21
-.04
.15
-.03
-.09
.09
-.03
-.10

Note. Factor loadings >.40 are in boldface. Exploratory factor analysis was conducted using principal axis
factoring with direct oblimin rotation. The scree plot-method (Fabrigar et al., 1999) indicated that three factors
should be extracted, accounting for 65.63% of the variance in PAQ item scores. Factor 1 (eigenvalue = 11.53),
which we call “P-DAF”, was comprised of all the P-DIF and P-DDF items. Factor 2 (eigenvalue = 2.33), which
we call “G-EOT”, was comprised of all the G-EOT items. Factor 3 (eigenvalue = 1.89), which we call “NDAF”, was comprised of all the N-DIF and N-DDF items. Correlations between these factors were as follows:
F1 and F2 = .54, F1 and F3 = -.57, F2 and F3 = -.48 (we name F3 “N-DAF” in the interest of simplicity to align
it with the name of the N-DAF composite score, however because the item loadings on this factor are negative,
this factor could be more accurately called “lack of N-DAF”). Thus, a distinction between the attention (EOT)
and appraisal (DIF, DDF) stages of emotion valuation emerged, as did a distinction between the appraisal of
negative and positive emotions. In other words, whilst our CFAs in this data-set made a distinction between DIF
and DDF items (within each valence domain), our EFA did not separate them. This difference between EFA and
CFA results has also emerged in research with the Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20 (TAS-20), whereby EFAs of
the TAS-20 commonly find the DIF and DDF items to load on a single factor (i.e., an “appraisal stage” factor),
whereas CFAs on these same data-sets find that there is statistical value in separating DIF and DDF (e.g., Erni,
Lotscher, & Modestin, 1997; Loas, Otmani, Verrier, Fremaux, & Marchand, 1996; Loas et al., 2001). These
patterns provide statistical support for the close conceptual clustering of DIF and DDF in the attention-appraisal
model of alexithymia (Preece, Becerra, Allan, Robinson, & Dandy, 2018).

